Abslracl-IP address and TCPNDP port scanning are critical components of many network attacks. Such scanning allows attackers to spread a self-propagating worm or collect detailed information about end-hosts in preparation for attacks. This paper investigates an algorithm to detect TCP-SYN scanning. Special care is taken to detect even stealthy scanners. Attackers are detected by tracking the number of half-open connections generated by each source. However, a source is only tracked until it is clear that it is not currently scanning. The computational load of this method is analyzed and it is found that the method is not computationally intensive and is suitable for online detection of scanning even on hackhone links. Specikally, on a backbone link investigated it was found that the total number of sources that needs to he tracked at any one time is at most a few thousand.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early days of the Internet, network attacks have been a diKkult problem [l] . As the economy, infrastructure, and society become more dependent on the Internet, network attacks pose a problem of more signib". Recently there have been major self-propagating worm attacks If an open port was found and the port supports an application that has an exploit, then the found host is inatrated. In order to propagate the worm quickly, an infected hosts must scan the address space at a high rate. However, this makes worm propagation very obvious and hence easy to detect and stop. A far more potent way to spread the worm is if the worm itself has a list of all vulnerable hosts. In this case, the worm does 0~7803-8335-4/04/$17.00 02004 AACC not have to perform the noticeable scanning and it can spread at very high rates. One way this can he done is for the worm designer to scan the address space in advance and maintain a database. It is possible to catalogue not only which IPS are active, but to determine the type and version of the OS and which services are offered for each IP [5] ,
[6], 171 , 181. When an exploit becomes available, the attacker could immediately develop a worm +at is sent only to the vulnerable hosts in the database. Since this highly virulent worm would spread while producing very few anomalous packets, it would he virtually undetectable.
Since the IP address space only holds merely 232 addresses, it is possible to send a TCP-SYN to every IP address in 38 houn over a IOMbps link. Thus, it is completely reasonable to expect that attackers will collect, catalogue, and distribute detailed maps of all end-hosts. While it is possible to scan the entire address space very fast, an attacker may want to scan more discretely and at a slow rate, where the whole address space is scanned over a period of weeks or even months. Also, the attacker may only scan a fraction of the address space until a vulnerable host is found. This vulnerable host is then inatrated and the scanning proceeds ffom this host. Thus, the entire address space can he scanned, but no single host will scan the whole address space. While difiult, the goal of this work is to detect these types of stealfhy scanning.
There has been investigations on the detection of scanning at Dewalls 191, [IO] . A Dewall detects scanning only if the attacker scans many of the organization's addresses. If the attacker scans addresses at random, the scans will infrequently fall into the organization's address space. The Bewall would require a long-term memory to detect such behavior. On the other hand, ifthe detection is done at a tier-1 or 2 router through which a large portion of the attackers scans pass, even a stealthy scanner can be detected. It has been shown there is a relatively small set of routers through which a large number of end-to-end connections pass [ 111.
Thus, by sharing information collected at these routers, it may be possible to detect even the most stealthy scanners. The goal of this paper is to detect scanning at backbone routers. We focus on a common form of scanning known as SYN scanning where the attacker sends TCP-SYN packets 988
[12], [6] . The method investigated here examines each TCP [bw. An alternative method is[2] to sample only a fraction of all Ebws. however, such methods cannot detect stealthy scanning. The detection scheme investigated here is quite thorough in the sense that the source of each TCP-SYN packet is tracked for at least a short period of time. Thus, even stealthy scanners can be detected. Nonetheless, it is found that when performing this detection on a backbone link that carried data at an average rate of 378 Mbps, the number of hosts that need to be tracked simultaneously is less than a few thousand. Maintaining and searching through a list of a few thousand addresses is within the abilities of today's processors. We make one critical assumption in this analysis: packets wifh spoofed source addresses are (7tered out or limited in number.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next three sections provide some background. AAer a brief discussion of the data utilized throughout this investigation, the basics of TCP connection establishment are reviewed followed by some further discussion about the scanning activity found in the data set. Section V begins the discussion of the algorithm. Section VI explores the computational efiiency of this method. Section VI1 provides some concluding remarks and discusses future work.
11. DATA DESCRIPTION The data used in this work was collected in a network of a US tier-I Internet Service Provider. [16] .' The Rst step of the connection establishment is when the client sends a TCP packet with the SYN Cag set (a TCP-SYN packet). Upon receiving this packet, the server responds with a TCP packet with both the SYN and ACK k g s set (a TCP-SYN/ACK packet). When the client receives the TCP-SYN/ACK, it responds with a TCP packet with the ACK LBg set (a TCP-ACK packet) or with a TCP data packet that also has the ACK LBg set. When the server receives the ACK from the client, the connection establishment phase of TCP is complete.
If the client does not receive a SYN/ACK fiom the server, it will resend the SYN typically after waiting for 'Far brevity, we call the opening end client and the responding end sene,. 3 seconds. If a SYNiACK still does not arrive, the client will send another SYN after 6 seconds. This doubling in time continues for a'total of 4 or 6 attempts (the exact number of attempts depends on the implementation). In most implementations, the maximum time between SYNs is 64 seconds [16] . Similarly, if the server does not receive an ACK within the time-out period, it will resent the SYN/ACK in the same pattern as the SYNs are sent.
At an intermediate router, the TCP connection is assumed to be complete when an ACK packet arrives from the client and is destined for the server. At this point, the router can assume that the destination has responded to the SYN and hence existsz. For detecting SYN scanning, the duration of the connection establishment plays a critical role. Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution of the connection establishment duration. For the link that we observe, it was found that the mean duration of the connection establishment is close to 0.3 seconds. Note that this duration is not simply a function of the round-trip time, but also a h c t i o n of how long it takes for a server to respond to a SYN.
To give an idea of TCP packets' statistics, we list in Table I We call the number of unique destinations that a sources has sent unanswered SYNs to be the degree of the source. We denote the degree of source o to be do. The hallmark of a scanning source is that it sends pure SYN Cows to a large number of destinations. The data examined here was found to contain many scanners (e.g., 251 sources sent more than 200 pure SYN Cows). Figure  2 gives an idea of the number and the behavior of the scanners. Note that the smallest number of non-pure SYN Cows shown here is 0. That is indicated by 0 on y-axis.
Sources that appear in the lower right of the plot are the ones that are mostly likely to be scanning as they send pure SYN Cows to a huge number of destinations, but few or no normal TCP connections. Indeed, if the source sends more than 1000 pure SYN Cows within two hours, the source is likely scanning. A mode careful analysis by examining the domain name of the addresses, ports, size and frequency of Cle transmission, etc c o n h s this conclusion. However, it is not clear whether the sources that send a moderate number of pure SYN cbws and non pure SYN Cows are scanning. We examined some of those sources by looking at their. We found that some of those sources that merely sent 50 pure SYN CDWS were likely scanners. Figure 2 shows that it is not trivial to draw a line between scanning sources and normal source. This d i n u l t y remains even when further information such as the non-pure SYN degree is considered. For this reason, the approach here will detect sources that scan a relatively small number of destinations. It is expected that ottine methods would perform evaluation of the sources detected by the method presented here.
There are some types of activity that appear to be scanning but are Utered out and not examined here. SpeciBally, some mail servers will try to open a connection on port 113. However, many Ctewalls block port 113. Hence, these mail servers will send a large number of pure SYN Cows. Similarly, port 25 is often blocked and, as a result, mail servers will send many pure SYN Cows to port 25. Also, to search for peers to share Oes, Gnutella and Kazaa will scan the address space. Thus, along with ports 113 and 25, Cbws on port 6346, 6347, and 1214 are ntered out of the data set.
v. TRACKING SOURCES
An attacker can scan the address space while utilizing a low packet rate. This is especially the case for stealthy scanners that send TCP-SYNs at a slow but steady rate. In order to detect such scanners, it is necessary to collect information about the hosts that send TCP-SYNs. The algorithm used to detect TCP-SYN scanners is as follows.
Assume that a SYN arrives at time to and no other SYNs have arrived fiom this source before this point. We denote d " ( t ) to be the degree observed t seconds since the source is being tracked. Thus, d" ( t ) is the number of unique destinations that source U sent unanswered SYNs to during the time interval (to, to + t). In the case of a normal TCP connection establishment, d" ( t ) = 1 for 0 2 t < T and d" ( t ) = 0 for t 2 T , where an ACK arrived from the source at time to + T .
In order for a router to determine do, it must observe and process packets from this source, that is the router must frack the source. When a packet arrives, it is Dst determined if the packet is a TCP packet. If so, it is determined if the source is already being tracked. Note that this requires searching through the list of sources that are being tracked. In order to minimize the computational load, it is necessary to minimize the size of this list.
Suppose that the just arrived packet is a SYN packet. If the source is not being tracked, then a new data structure is allocated and the source and destination of the SYN is recorded along with the arrival time of the SYN. If the source is being tracked, then the source's data stmcture is examined to see if a SYN destined to this destination has been observed. If so, then the time that this SYN arrived is updated. On the other hand, if the data structure does not contain an entry for this destination, a new entry is made which contains the address of the destination. Now if the packet is a TCP-ACK or a TCP data packet, then the list of tracked sources is also searched for this source. If the source is found to not be tracked, then there is no change to the list of tracked sources. On the other hand, if this source is being tracked and there is an entry for this destination address, the entry is deleted because the TCP-ACK or data packet indicates that the connection is now completely open. If there are no more entries for this source, the data structure for this source is deleted and the source is no longer tracked until another SYN arrives form this source.
Note that while a connection remains in its half open state, the source is tracked. In the case that a source has sent SYNs that are never answered, i.e., pure SYN b w s , then this source is tracked for a longer period of time. As mentioned, it is critical to keep the list of tracked source small. Therefore, the objective is to not track sources of pure SYN Cows for too long.
In order to reduce the computational load, it is necessary to limit the number of sources that are being tracked. Thus, it is critical to stop tracking non-scanning sources as soon as possible while ensuring that these sources are indeed not scanning. Since the detection of stealthy scanners is the objective of this work, the goal of not missing scanners takes precedence over concerns of computational load. However, as will be shown in the next section, the impact of detecting even stealthy scanners does not add a signimant load to a detector that can detect aggressive
We will assume that it is not possible for a source to be scanning if the degree of the source that sent pure SYN [Ibws grows at a rate that is less than R for some R.
Therefore, if a source does not send a SYN in the 1/R seconds after a the Dst SYN was sent'of a pure SYN Cow, then this source does not need to be tracked until it sends another SYN. In general, source CT cannot be currently scanning if t > d'(t)/R, where t is the time that has elapsed since this source has been tracked and d" is deChed in Section V.
As discussed in Section V, since SYNs may be answered, an unanswered SYN might or might not lead to a pure S Y N cbw. Thus, the value of d" ( t ) might decrease over time. If do ( t ) > H ( t ) , it does not necessarily mean that the source is scanning. We deme H (2') to be the threshold such that if a source sends more than H ( T ) SYNs within T seconds, then the source is declared to be a scanner. Specikally, we deme scanning. 
VI. COMPUTATION LOAD
When tracking sources, the source address of each TCP packet must be compared with the sources of the addresses that are being tracked. Searching through this list of tracked sources is the principal computational load for this method.
In this section we examine the length of this list. We will see that the list of tracked sources is surprisingly small indicating that such detection could be performed even on backbone routers.
Recall that searching through an ordered list of length N can be accomplished in 0 (log ( N ) ) comparisons. In our experiments, a straightforward implementation of a binary tree was utilized. However, if a suitable hashing function is found, then a hash table would likely further reduced the computation. Furthermore, high speed network processors are becoming available. For example, Intel's network processor IXP2800 can process packets and provide 23 billion operations per second. For the link examined, this algorithm would require memory accesses roughly every loons, well within the reach of today's processors such as IXP2800.
The list of tracked sources is made up of three types of sources: sources that are establishing normal TCP connections, sources that are not scanning, but send pure SYN tbws, and sources that are scanning or likely scanning. We examine these parts of the list in the following sections.
Three approaches to examining the computational load are taken. In Section VI-E, the detection algorithm is tested with the data described in Section 11. A second approach is to directly analyze the;computational load. A third approach is to develop models bf the network trafi3 and determine the computational load based on the models. These last two amroaches are closelv related and are Dresented in ..
source U is scanning if d& ( t ) > H (t -64).
the following subsections. Beyond the conclusion that such detection appears to be computationally feasible, are the results that the model of the network t r a n are simple and Ct well. Similarly, we will see that models for the computational load are simple and U well.
A. Computational load of detecting normal connection establishments
One might expect that at any particular moment there are a huge number of half open connections. Indeed, the data set investigated here had 38.8 million TCP connections in two hours. Since the source of the half open connections must be tracked, these sources can potentially cause very large lists. However, as will be shown, this is not the case. There are two principal reasons that this list is short. First, the duration of the connection establishment typically lasts around 300 ms. Thus, the number of simultaneously ongoing connection establishment is limited. And the second, there are a few sources that generate a large fraction of the connections. Indeed, some of these hosts establish connections so frequently that multiple establishments from the same source are tracked at the same time. Figure 3 shows the complementary cumulative distribution of the rate at which each source establishes TCP connections. Specikally, it shows the fraction of sources that made connections faster than c, where c is the independent variable on the X-axis. We see that there are some sources that made connections with a huge number of destinations. For example, I in 10000 sources made connections with 100 or more destinations. These sources contribute to make large fraction of connections.
In order to understand how long the list of tracked sources will be, we model the list as a M/G/co queuing system. The entry in the list of tracked sources can hold information about a large number of ongoing connection establishments, i.e. is a inkite number of servers. The rate that customers arrive into this system is the rate at which the source attempts to establish connections. The service time in the system is the time it takes to establish a TCP connection. Hence, when all queues in the system are empty, there is no entry in the list for the source. Thus, the fraction of time that this source is being tracked is the same as this fraction of time that this inthite queue system is not empty. 
Normal connection list length
where U is the connection establishment rate, is the total number of source addresses that pass through the router and 6 (U) is the density' of nodes with connection establishment rate U. The analysis presented (both the direct approach via (3) or model-based approach via (4)) are conservative because they assume that each source establishes connections according to a Poisson process. This assumption produces widely spaced connection establishments. In reality, a source may establish connections in a more bursty fashion. As a result, some connection establishments might be more closely spaced so that they overlap more than predicted by the Poisson model. Since the total time in which a source is tracked is reduced when connection establishments overlap, bursty connection establishments by a source would reduce the length of the list.
B. Computational load due to non-scanning pure SI" sources While scanning sources will send a moderate or large number of pure SYN Cows, normal, non-malicious, endhosts will also occasionally send pure SYN Cows. The source of these pure SYN Cows must be tracked to ensure that they are not scanning. In the case of normal TCP connection establishments, it was critical to realize that a small number of sources engaged in establishing a large number of connections. This allows the tracking of a single source to track many open SYN simultaneously. However, when tracking non-scanning sources, there is no similar henem. Furthermore, while a normal connection establishment requires a source to be tracked for roughly 300ms, the source of a pure SYN Cow must be tracked for far longer. Nonetheless, the number of sources that send such pure SYN Cows is small enough that the number of such sources that is tracked at any one time is small. In this section the computational load associated with these non-scanning sources of pure SYN tbws is analyzed. Specikally, we old the number of such sources that are simultaneously tracked. As in the previous section, we take two approaches. First we apply some simple analysis to estimate the number. Second, we model the distributions of the t r a a and estimate the number based on the model. While more work is required, it is hoped that the model parameters derived from the data examined here is similar to the model parameters for other backbone links, modulo the data rate carried by the link.
In this section the assumption that packets with spoofed address have been dtered out is critical. If this is not the case, then a single source can send a large number of SYNs each with different source addresses as is the case in a DOS SYN attack. Such an attack would certainly cause the list of tracked sources to grow very large. However, as mentioned, there has been extensive work on [Itering packets with spoofed source addressed. For example, the Cisco's 10s software Release ll.I(l7)CC has such capabilities.
To analyze the computational load due to non-scanning pure SYN sources, we assume that the threshold for scanning is of the form (I) . Thus, a source is not scanning if the total number bf pure SYN Cbws sent within T seconds is less than V . As mentioned, for each pure SYN Cow that a source sends, the sources is tracked for a On the other hand, ,the average rate that a source sends pure SYN Cows is d" ( T ) / T . We denote this rate as re, With the threshold of the form (I) , sources that send pure SYN Cows at an average rate that is less than V/T are not scanning. Let f (7) he the fraction of sources that send pure 
SYNS.
Complementary distribution of the rate of a source sending pure where a source is declared to be scanning if it sends pure SYN [bws at an average rate of R over the time interval T (i.e., R = V / T ) . Figure 5 shows this value (6) for different values of R. We see that using the model with a continuous distribution via (6) yields the same result as the direct approach given by (5).
The objective of this work is to detect and track sources that are scanning, i.e., sources that send more than H (t) pure SYN Cows during a time period of length t. There is no way to limit the impact of tracking these sources as the objective is to track them. Once a source is declared to be scanning, all packets that come from it should be collected for later investigation. Nonetheless, when a packet arrives, it must be determined if the source of the packet is known to be a scanner, is cmently being tracked, or not being tracked. This classikation requires searching through the list of addresses and the list must include the sources that are known scanners.
The analysis of computational load of tracking scanning sources is similar to load of non-scanning sources. Specifically, the number of scanning sources is c l.
Employing f , the distribution of the rate that sources send pure SYN Cows, the number of scanning sources is Figure 7 shows the number of detected scanners as a function of different thresholds V in (I) . Again, the direct approach and model-based approach agree. ..
..
In the data examined here we found that the number of D, ~~~~l comDutotiona~ load sources that send pure SYN CDWS is 14736 in the data studied here, or 4.5% of the total sources that sent any TCP SYN. Further data analysis is required to determine if this percentage is similar to the percentage found on other backbone links. Similarly, M e r investigation is required to determine if the distribution of the model parameter, a and p, are similar to those found on other links.
Like the analysis in the previous section, the analysis here is conservative. Here it is assumed that when a source sends
The total computational load is the sum of the computational load of the three parts, tracking TCP connection establishments, tracking non-scanning sources, and tracking scanning sources. Left-hand plot of Figure 8 shows the total average number of simultaneously tracked sources, both from direct analysis and using t r a a models. Right-hand plot of Figure 8 attempting to connect to a disconnected host and hence send many SYNS in a short Period of time. In this case, these SYNs are tracked together, while the analysis here assumes that each [4w is tracked individually.
C. Computational load due lo scanning sources indication of the computational load due for the detection of the link examined, this detection method would require between 10 and 12 memoly per TCP packet, Since this link had a packet arrival rate of 83K packets per second (SYN packet arrival rate is under 4,00O/sec) this detection method would require an memory this is often not the case a non-scannins ~~c e may be method, Note the computational load varies quite slowly.
In the access roughly once every 100 ns; this is well with the reach of today's microprocessors.
E. Deteclion test
The algorithm was tested on the data collect kom the backbone link described in Section 11. The right-hand plot in Figure 9 shows the number of sources tracked while the left-hand plot shows the histogram of the number of tracked sources. Here the source is declared to be a scanner if it sends more than 50 pure SYN Dws in two hours. It can be seen that the variance of the list size appears to he small. The algorithm was further tested for different thresholds. Figure IO shows the mean list length (left side) and number of scanners (right side) as a function of different thresholds V . It can be seen that the actual list length in these Cgures is smaller than that given by the analysis in the previous sections. In light of the discussion at the end of sections VI-A and VI-B, we expect this to be the case.
VII. CONCLUSION
The method investigated here tracks every source that sends an unanswered TCP-SYN. As a result, it is able to detect even stealthy scanners. On the other hand, since most hosts do not send an unanswered SYN very 6e-quently, tracking such sources is computational feasible. The analysis indicates that the computational complexity of the method is not sensitive to variations in the t r a n characteristics. Thus, we expect that detecting TCP-SYN scanning at the backbone is feasible. Of come, a key assumption is that packets with spoofed source addresses are Citered. Nonetheless, this analysis shows that some stateful tltering at even backbone links is feasible.
This detection scheme does not detect all types of scanning. However, for most other types of scanning, detection can be carried out perhaps by employing a scheme similar to the one presented here. For example, there are other scanning techniques that do not use SYh's. Some of these are easily detectable: since they send TCP packets with the Ckgs set in a nonsensical fashion (e.g., both SYN and FIN set). Detecting these types of scanning is the focus of ongoing effort.
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